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Exploring the Policy Value of Cable
Franchise and PEG Fees
Duncan Stewart and Lee Shaker

ABSTRACT
Subscribers to cable television typically pay Franchise and Public–Educational–
Governmental (PEG) Fees. Ostensibly, these monthly fees exist to compensate
communities for the private use of public goods and to bolster the marketplace of
ideas. Little empirical research, however, assesses the utility of these fees as policy
mechanisms. In this article, we track the existence and dispensation of the fees
in the 20 largest American cities by examining their recent annual budgets. This
provides a foundation to consider the fees’ contributions in the context of ongoing legal challenges to their existence and the increase of digital television services
beyond their purview.
Keywords: Telecommunication, PEG, franchise, democracy, local media

For decades, most cable subscribers in the United States have paid a pair
of obscure, but not insubstantial, fees every month. Cable Franchise and
Public–Educational–Governmental (PEG) Fees are regulated by both state
and federal law, were historically negotiated city-by-city, and specified in
the individual cable franchise agreements that give cable companies the
legal right to offer paid television services within specific communities.
According to current law, these fees are only attached to traditional cable
pay television packages and are not levied upon satellite television subscriptions, broadband internet services, or “over-the-top” video products
like Netflix (which may be subject to different taxes). Combined, the fees
usually add 5–8 percent to each subscriber’s monthly bill. Conservatively,
they yield many hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue for local governments nationwide each year. The particulars of these fees are often
opaque to consumers and it may not be immediately apparent why they
exist in lieu of a traditional sales tax.
Duncan Stewart: University of Utah
Lee Shaker: Portland State University
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This work is licensed under Creative Commons Attribution CC-BY-NC-ND

Policy Value of Cable Franchise and PEG Fees

443

Franchise and PEG Fees were originally conceptualized as a form of compensation for the public provided by cable companies to defray the costs
associated with the use of public resources.1 PEG Fees, in particular, were
defined to provide financial support for the creation and distribution of
grassroots, diverse media content to bolster the marketplace of ideas.2 After
more than three decades, little is known about the way that fee proceeds are
used by local governments though this fee regime still supersedes the application of regular sales taxes upon cable services in most communities nationwide. On one hand, revenue from these fees could be used to bolster local
communities by repairing roads and funding key elements of local information landscapes like community media centers, coverage of governmental
proceedings, and libraries.3 On the other hand, cities may squander these
resources on bureaucratic offices of information policy or channel them into
general operating funds that offer little accountability or transparency. In
either case, their existence imposes a range of costs upon municipalities, cable
providers, and ultimately consumers as they are negotiated and disbursed.
In this article, we systematically track the existence and dispensation of
Franchise and PEG Fees in each of the 20 largest cities in the United States
during one recent year. By examining annual budgets from each of these
cities, we document the collection and allocation of these fees in as much
detail as possible given the available public records. Our research shows
which cities are collecting which fees and how they are allocating these
resources. In turn, our analysis provides an empirical foundation for assessing the fees’ current and future utility in the context of ongoing legal challenges to their existence and the increase of digital television services that
exist outside their purview. Results show that these fees provide substantial
funding to cities and that a portion of it is channeled to activities that likely
bolster the marketplace of ideas—but the bulk of related revenue flows into
general operating budgets. Once fee revenue enters general operating budgets, it is difficult to document the activities it supports. In most cities, the
majority of fee revenue does not appear to support communication-related
policies or directly mitigate the costs borne by cities as a result of cable providers’ infrastructure activities. Consequently, our analysis suggests that the
fees largely function like unrestricted sales taxes and that PEG obligations,
in particular, are not consistently met. Given these findings, we argue that

1. Parker.
2. Ali, Media Localism.
3. Waldman.
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regulators must find new ways to hold communities accountable or work
to develop alternative mechanisms to pursue local information policy goals
going forward. In the absence of such reform, the special costs imposed by
the current fee regime are not justified by the results in many locales.

Franchise and PEG Fees: An Overview
Building the infrastructure to provide cable television is a disruptive and
costly process. Cities cannot allow cable providers to dig up city streets
without requiring compensation to fund their repair and an orderly process to minimize public inconvenience. But at the same time, cable companies cannot justify the large investment that building a complete local
cable system requires without clarity regarding the costs that they will
incur to access potential customers. To balance these interests, cities and
cable providers negotiate franchise agreements. For cities, franchise agreements ideally ensure universal access to cable for local households, enough
revenue to cover public costs incurred as a result of the presence of a cable
system (i.e., road repairs), and additional resources to improve the local
marketplace of ideas. For cable companies, franchise agreements ideally
limit both the amount of compensation to cities and the uncertainty associated with providing paid television services within a locale. Federal law
does not require cable companies to serve every home within local communities nor does it require cities to open public land to paid television
providers. Consequently, both sides have some leverage in the negotiation
of local franchise agreements and, more specifically, the fees they contain.
The modern form of PEG and Franchise Fees can be traced to the
Cable Communications Policy Act (CCPA) of 1984.4 In the wake of several attempts by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to
develop franchising regulations in the 1970s which were disputed on First
Amendment grounds, Congress implemented the CCPA which established durable legislation to guide cable system ownership, rates, content,
and franchising agreements.5 Most germane to this research, the CCPA
offered several specific guidelines for the Franchise and PEG Fees that local
governments could include in franchise agreements. According to federal
law, a Franchise Fee may be levied upon cable companies (which may, in

4. Parker.
5. Ali, Media Localism.
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turn, pass it on to subscribers) in exchange for the use of public rights
of way (e.g., cable lines buried beneath local roads). The Franchise Fee
is capped by federal law at a maximum of 5 percent of the gross income
derived from the provision of paid television services. Federal law leaves
the allocation of this income to the discretion of individual locales. In
addition to the Franchise Fee, the CCPA also allows local authorities to
specify a PEG Fee.6
Conventionally, the PEG Fee is set between 1 and 3 percent of the
gross revenue from paid television services. Traditionally, federal law did
not cap the PEG Fee, but it mandated that proceeds from the PEG Fee
could only be used for public access broadcasting, educational media and
broadcasting, government access television, and/or the capital costs of
PEG facilities—though enforcement procedures to ensure adherence to
this mandate were not specified.
Even with the passage of the CCPA and the practical motivation shared
by cable companies and local authorities to negotiate workable franchise
agreements, Franchise and PEG Fees have engendered intermittent legal
debate. Shortly after the CCPA’s passage, Saylor7 and Krug8 suggested that
cable operators could be conceptualized as First Amendment speakers.
From this perspective, Saylor, Krug, and others9 argue that cable providers’
speech rights are violated if the presence of either fee cannot be justified
by a direct need for revenue that arises from the cable providers’ activities.
This line of logic rests upon Minneapolis Star and Tribune Co. v. Minnesota
Commissioner of Revenue, a 1983 Supreme Court ruling that found a special
tax on the Minneapolis Star unconstitutional because the city did not need
the additional revenue as a result of costs incurred by the operation of the
paper. Similar logic fuels recent reinterpretation of the PEG provisions of
the CCPA.10 Though still disputed, recent FCC rulings assert that PEG
Fees in excess of the 5 percent Franchise Fee may only cover capital costs
associated with PEG activities.11 Support for programming or staff must
now be deducted from the 5 percent Franchise Fee—substantially reducing resources available for PEG content. Generally speaking, the FCC’s
role in administering the Fees is limited to adjudicating disputes and the

6. Goldfarb, “Public, Educational, and Governmental (PEG) Access.”
7. Saylor.
8. Krug.
9. Geller, Ciamporcero, and Lampert.
10. Goldfarb, “Public, Educational, and Governmental (PEG) Access.”
11. Federal Communications Commission.
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commission does not provide any oversight (or enforcement) regarding the
allocation of the associated revenues.
In addition, since 2005 approximately 20 states have enacted legislation
that shifts franchising authority to the state-level and further constrains
Franchise and PEG Fees.12
Kentucky, for example, attempted to strip local communities of the
ability to set fees in franchise agreements and substitute lower statewide
Franchise (3 percent) and PEG (2.4 percent) rates—though the legislation
was eventually found unconstitutional by the state supreme court.13 Similarly,
in San Francisco, annual PEG revenue decreased by nearly $600,000
because California instituted a lower cap on the fee.14 Telecommunications
companies—and some consumer advocates—have worked hard to
encourage the move toward statewide franchising in order to smooth
the entry of new competitors into local markets (and lower costs), often
overcoming strenuous opposition from local governments and community
activists who fear the loss of resources.15 Meanwhile, a recent lawsuit in
Iowa filed on behalf of subscribers leveraged the Minneapolis Star ruling to
challenge the legality of Franchise and PEG Fees and seek redress for fees
that extended beyond the capital costs incurred by cities as a result of cable
system activities.16 In Portland, Oregon, a similar lawsuit alleged that the
city misallocated $14 million of Franchise and PEG Fee revenue,17though it
was quickly dismissed.18 To plaintiffs in these actions, the fees have dubious
value. The most visible use of fee revenue is sometimes risible public access
programming and citizens may struggle to discern other uses of fee funding. In some cases, cable providers’ actions further obscure and diminish
the value produced by the fees. For example, AT&T recently placed all
PEG programming on a single channel accessible only through a special
digital set-top box after navigating through multiple drop-down menus.19
Aside from the recent legal wrangling, both fees face an uncertain future
as the public transitions from traditional cable television packages toward

12. Goldfarb, “Public, Educational, and Governmental (PEG) Access.”
13. Kentucky League of Cities; “Excise Tax—Multichannel Video Programming Services”;
“Imposition of Tax on Gross Revenues.”
14. Waldman.
15. Ali, Media Localism.
16. Saul.
17. Rogoway, “Lawsuit Claims Portland.”
18. Rogoway, “Judge Tosses out Suit.”
19. Waldman.
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new services offered online. Subscribers to Netflix, Hulu, and other internet video services do not pay Franchise or PEG Fees and, consequently,
revenue from the fees will naturally wither without new legislation if people substitute these services for cable. Yet, even as the media technologies
that deliver television are changing, the public interests that motivated the
Franchise and PEG Fees persist.

Cable Fees, Communication Policy, and Local Media
In the context of cable television, the Franchise and PEG Fees are key
expressions of the federal government’s commitment to media localism
and diversity.20 Local media have long been thought to be a vital component of well-functioning democratic communities.21
Historically, theorists argued that by providing a common information base rooted in proximate events and issues, newspapers defined and
oriented communities toward public matters of substance.22 Subsequent
shared conversation nurtured the cohesion and cooperation necessary for
healthy civic and political participation.23 From this intellectual foment,
localism and diversity emerged early in the twentieth century as media
policy tenets adopted by the FCC during the development of electronic
media. Ideally, regulation following these principles would ensure that
diverse information about local matters and organizations was made widely
accessible even if citizens relied on radio and television outlets rather than
newspapers. In fact, a growing body of recent research24 lends empirical
support to the FCC’s embrace of localism and diversity. This work shows
that use of and access to local news media correlates with higher local
political knowledge, more civic engagement, and more local political
participation—all outcomes that justify policy that stimulates production
and consumption of local, diverse information.
More specifically, localism is an orientation toward crafting communication infrastructure around the needs of local communities to enrich a sense
of local identity and strengthen participation in democratic institutions.25

20. Napoli.
21. Janowitz.
22. De Tarde.
23. Janowitz.
24. Hayes and Lawless; Mondak; Schulhofer-Wohl and Garrido; Shaker.
25. Napoli.
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The FCC’s diversity tenet is intended to produce policy that increases
opportunities for the voices of many different community members to be
amplified and heard.26 Throughout the twentieth century, the FCC sought
to safeguard local, diverse media even as national and international media
expanded. For example, the FCC long enforced ownership limits on broadcast (and by extension print) media outlets designed to encourage local
control of media—though these caps have been weakened repeatedly over
time.27 The FCC’s position in Carter Mountain Transmission Corporation v.
Federal Communications Commission crystallizes its commitment to local
content in regards to cable television. To protect local voices, the FCC was
willing to fight to curb cable providers’ First Amendment rights by mandating that they retransmit local channels and reserve space and resources
for public access television.
The FCC’s interest in public access television may especially be seen
through the lens of a commitment to the diversity principle.28 In practice,
public access facilities stimulate the creation and distribution of content
that often falls outside of commercial boundaries because of its production
quality, topic matter, or potential audience.29 Public access programming
may at times be farcical, but it can also directly serve the democratic goals
of the diversity principle.30 A vein of qualitative research shows that, at
least in some circumstances, PEG funding provides vital support for producing and disseminating both records of governmental activity and the
voices of those otherwise not well represented in the public sphere.31 For
example, PEG facilities frequently ensure multilingual access to television
programming that is otherwise lacking. “In Minnesota, the Saint Paul
Neighborhood Network (SPNN) offered eight programs for the growing
Somali population in the area” and throughout the United States, public
access channels provided programming in “Greek, Czech, Hungarian,
Albanian, German, French, Portuguese, Vietnamese, Chinese, Korean,
Hmong, Farsi, Arabic, Hebrew, and Swahili.”32 At its best, this sort of public access content empowers and activates citizens who may otherwise not
find a connection to established democratic institutions.

26. Einstein.
27. McChesney.
28. Linder.
29. Devine.
30. Kellner.
31. Chen et al.
32. Waldman.
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The persistent, inexorable decline of traditional local media businesses
is creating new challenges for the FCC’s commitment to localism and
diversity. Annual reports by the Pew Research Center show sustained,
secular declines in daily local newspaper revenue continuing for the past
two decades—a problem that is driving newspapers to lay off reporters,
reduce the number of local stories covered, publish less frequently and, at
times, close entirely.33 In addition, growing corporate ownership of local
television stations is often paired with cost-cutting measures that reduce
newsroom staffing.34 Commercial efforts leveraging new digital technologies to fill the market for local information—such as Patch.com—have
largely failed so far. A smattering of nonprofit approaches—some driving
new online operations, others oriented to support legacy print media—are
being explored across the United States.35 Some of these fledgling initiatives may prove successful, but they may not be easily replicated in different communities with idiosyncratic needs and cultures. Cultivating
healthy local information environments in the twenty-first century is a
vexing—and controversial—task that looms unresolved.36
In the midst of this upheaval, many PEG facilities operating at the
convergence of technological change and shifting audience preferences
are finding ways to stay relevant. Case studies of communities across the
United States show “public access stations” reformulating themselves as
“community media centers.”37 In these facilities, the content produced—
distributed online as well as through cable systems—is an outgrowth of
more fundamental contributions: the training and empowering of citizens
and the creation of a locus of community. In community media centers, the
range of activity is broad: traditional television programs and segments are
produced, but there is also an emphasis on teaching media literacy, offering skills training, and experimenting with new technology. In sum, such
efforts connect “ethnically diverse and economically challenged groups to
advanced digital equipment and skills” which are then used in “empowered forms of participation [by] local residents who use access resources
to pursue wellbeing in different spheres of their lives, from community
engagement and self-expression, to vocational and career development.”38

33. Barthell.
34. McLean.
35. Ali and Damian.
36. Napoli and Friedland.
37. Ali, “The Last PEG.”
38. Fuentas-Bautista.
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For example, in Portland, Oregon, Open Signal—formerly Portland
Community Media—recently invested in incubating a community of virtual reality (VR) hobbyists which, in turn, fed into burgeoning VR activity
at local advertising agencies like Wieden+Kennedy.39 Though little research
quantifies the effects of these activities, a recent survey-based study in
Austin, Texas found that, in spite of the rise of YouTube and other online
platforms, “PEG channels remain a highly relevant source of information”
particularly for African American, Hispanic, and less-educated residents.40
So, as other local media institutions break down, at least some PEG facilities—like public libraries—are evolving to serve community needs in the
twenty-first century.
As the transition to digital media proceeds, regulatory mechanisms
may bolster local information environments as they have in the past. For
example, the recent expansion of low-power FM radio broadcasting is an
attempt to use policy to stimulate the proliferation of grassroots voices.41
Franchise and PEG Fees are an old policy mechanism that may have a
new life in this environment. Wireline and wireless broadband internet
services both rely upon the same public goods—land and spectrum—that
provide the foundation for cable and broadcast media. The same logic that
historically allowed FCC regulation of analog media in favor of localism
and diversity can be used to justify modern policies that echo the Franchise
and PEG Fees. But, before advocating for their extension to digital television offerings, the utility of each fee as a mechanism for encouraging
the foment of diverse community media activity should be assessed. As
Anderson42 suggests, a policy’s success can best be determined by comparing its outcomes to the boundaries of the principles that justified its
implementation. Localism and diversity cannot be said to be advanced by
the Franchise and PEG Fees unless they are increasing the likelihood that
the public is exposed to or engaged with PEG facilities.43 This can only be
the case if Franchise and PEG Fees are reliably used to fund community
media centers and related activities. If revenue from these fees is simply
supporting cities’ operating budgets, then it is not being used to stimulate the local marketplace of ideas and other tactics to do so should be
investigated.
39. Justen Harn, Personal communication, April 2017.
40. Chen et al., 278.
41. Dunbar-Hester.
42. Anderson.
43. Entman and Wildman; Levin.
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Research Questions
Ideally, citizens in communities across the United States could easily ascertain both how much they paid in Franchise and PEG Fees and how local
authorities allocated the cumulative proceeds. With this information,
members of the public, academics, and policy makers could determine if
the fees were producing satisfactory outcomes. Generally speaking, however, both sides of the fee equation are opaque: it is difficult to determine
either how much money is collected or how it is spent. In fact, beyond
anecdote and the occasional case study of local public access facilities,
there is virtually no foundation for an empirical assessment of Franchise
and PEG Fees. In order to remedy this lacuna, the research questions that
drive this research are:
RQ1: Are Franchise Fees being collected in the 20 largest cities in the
United States? If so, how much revenue did they yield in each city?
How is Franchise Fee revenue spent in each city?
RQ2: Are PEG Fees being collected in the 20 largest cities in the
United States? If so, how much revenue did they yield in each city?
How is PEG Fee revenue spent in each city? Is this spending consistent with federal mandates for PEG revenue?

Method
Public accounting of both revenue and expenditure at the local level is an
important starting point for assessing the existence and value of Franchise
and PEG Fees. Accordingly, this research examines annual budgets from
the 20 largest cities in the United States.44 The largest American cities were
examined for several reasons. First, these franchise agreements affect the
largest number of subscribers. Second, the cumulative scale of funding
in these large cities produces enough revenue to support more ambitious investments in local information activities than may be possible in
smaller cities. Third, these cities are scattered across the country, providing a glimpse of conditions in different states, regions, and franchising

44. These cities were selected according to city population, not metropolitan area, because cable
franchise agreements are typically negotiated by individual cities.
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environments. Finally, a practical consideration: budget information
related to cable activities and pertinent news coverage is much more accessible for the largest cities than for smaller communities.
Analysis of municipal budgets is a challenging task. When possible, the
most recent actual budget figures reported by each city are used in this
analysis. Unfortunately, not all cities publish final retrospective accounting
numbers so, for eight cities, estimated or projected budget numbers are
used.45 While actual budget results are preferable because they document
real revenue and expenditure patterns, budget projections are useful in that
they are (hopefully) reflective of prior budget outcomes. Each budget was
thoroughly inspected to determine whether or not it reported the collection of PEG and Franchises Fees and, if so, the total revenue from those
fees. Any evidence of disbursements to cable-related and/or PEG purposes
in these budgets is also reported here. Finally, state laws, local franchise
agreements, and relevant news coverage were all reviewed to further contextualize the information in each budget. Even without financial specifics,
these secondary sources are valuable because they document the likelihood
of missing information in city budgets that thwarts further assessment of
the Franchise and PEG Fees. They also allow us to distinguish between
cities that fail to report information about fees that exist and cities that
simply do not levy either of the fees.
The results are organized in three sections. First, we report whether
Franchise and PEG Fees exist in each city. The fees are dependent on state
law as well as each unique franchising agreement, so the absence of either
fee in a budget (or in related documentation) can be the result of the
city’s choice not to levy either fee on cable carriers or a statewide prohibition against doing so. For cities that do administer fees, we then summarize the total reported fee revenue and the allocations made to fund
cable-related activities. These allocations typically go to a department or
office that is tasked with telecommunication matters such as the collection
and disbursements of Franchise Fees, coordinating PEG programming,
and negotiating new franchise agreements. Finally, we use the budgets and
other related documentation to categorize and tally city spending in three
cable-related areas as completely as possible: administrative, infrastructure,
and PEG-related expenditures. Administrative expenditures include utility

45. Budget cycles also differ across cities, so the specific numbers reported in this analysis are
not all from the same year. See Appendix A for more detail on the data as well as on statewide
legislation and local franchise agreements.
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management and staff salaries for departments charged with the operation
of cable television-related activities. Infrastructure expenditures are outlays for the cutting and repair of streets and other physical maintenance.
PEG expenditures support the production of public, educational, and government programming through the acquisition of video equipment, the
training of students and members of the public, the staffing of production
teams, and even, in the case of San Diego, library improvement. Transfers
to the general fund—explicitly listed or implicitly occurring—are not
included in these categories. Rollover funds from prior or to subsequent
fiscal years are also excluded from the tabulations.

Results
Table 1 documents the collection of PEG and Franchise Fees. All 20 cities
collected a Franchise Fee. There is also evidence that 16 of the 20 cities
collected a PEG Fee—though nine cities that likely collect a PEG Fee
do not report details of it in their budgets. Of the 20 cities, local franchise agreements and state laws suggest that only four cities do not levy
a PEG Fee. There is evidence that all 20 cities support at least some form
of government broadcasting—though of those 20, only 11 provide public
access broadcasting opportunities. Government broadcasting even in communities like Phoenix which eschew PEG Fees indicates some cities use
other resources to finance the operations of the government and perhaps
even, in some cases, public access broadcasting. Additional detail regarding
the PEG content made available in each city is beyond the scope of this
analysis.
Table 2 documents cable-related revenues and expenditures to the
extent possible using the cities’ public budgets. On the left side of the
table, Franchise and PEG Fee revenues are specified separately. Total
reported cable-related disbursements are listed in the center, followed by a
breakdown of the expenditures by purpose. Revenue derived from the fees
that remains after all reported cable-related allocations is shown in the last
column. This money may be absorbed by a city’s general fund or saved for
the allocation in future years toward PEG or other cable-related purposes.
Franchise Fee revenue is reported in every city except Indianapolis,
but the precise amount collected is unclear in six cities. In several cities
(El Paso, Jacksonville, New York City, San Antonio) cable franchise r evenue
is lumped together with telephone franchise revenue and Dallas reports
franchise revenue from all utilities (cable, phone, gas, etc.) in the aggregate.
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Franchise and PEG Fees

City

Franchise Fee
Collected

PEG Fee
Collected

Public Access
TV Available

Statewide
Franchising

Austin

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Charlotte

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Chicago

Yes

Not specified

Yes

Yes

Columbus

Yes

No

No

Yes

Dallas

Yes

Not specified

No

Yes

Detroit

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

El Paso

Yes

Not specified

No

Yes

Fort Worth

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Houston

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Indianapolis

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Jacksonville

Yes

No

No

Yes

Los Angeles

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

New York

Yes

Not specified

Yes

No

Philadelphia

Yes

Not specified

Yes

No

Phoenix

Yes

No

No

No

San Antonio

Yes

Not specified

Yes

Yes

San Diego

Yes

Not specified

No

Yes

San Francisco

Yes

Not specified

Yes

Yes

San Jose

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Seattle

Yes

Not specified

Yes

No

Cities that do not specify a PEG Fee are distinct from those in which no fee exists in that relevant
franchise agreements or state laws indicate that a PEG Fee exists—the budgets just fail to report
information about it.

San Francisco reports a small sum related to cable television fines, but
it is not reporting Franchise revenue clearly. Such accounting procedures
prevent close scrutiny of the cable fees in these communities. Setting aside
these vagaries, the budgets document hundreds of millions of dollars
of cable fee-related revenue across these 20 cities in just one fiscal year.
Viewed at either the subscriber or the city level, the fees are substantial.
In Austin, Texas, there were 358,401 households in the city as of 2014.46 If
Austinites subscribed to cable at roughly the national average, 45 percent
of households—or 161,280—would have active cable connections.47

46. United States Census Bureau.
47. Statista.

$7,919,995

$29,200,000

$9,600,000

Chicago

Columbus

$27,394,587

$7,188,253

$9,682,169#

$6,766,484

$23,400,000

Not reported

$35,300,000#

$12,940,888

$167,270,000

$21,559,000

Dallas

Detroit

El Paso

Fort Worth

Houston

Indianapolis

Jacksonville

Los Angeles

New York

Philadelphia

a

$9,216,223

Charlotte

Franchise Fee Revenue

Cable-Related City Finances

Austin

City

table 2

Not reported

Not reported

$5,900,541

No fee

$503,075

$4,675,400

$1,200,000

Not reported

Not reported

Not reported

$10,108,489

Not reported

$503,075

$4,706,738

$332,200

$670,332

$1,440,373

$2,567,235

Not reported

$602,665

$1,055,233

$656,297

$0

$3,344,086

Total Cable
Allocations

No fee

Not reported

No fee

$1,843,245

PEG Fee Revenue

Unknown

Unknown

$9,310,740

Unknown

$0

$2,411,738

$0

$0

$1,198,390

$343,806

$0

$0

$0

$0

Administrative
Expenditures

Unknown

Unknown

$161,405

Unknown

$0

$0

$0

$0

$0

$701,988

$0

$0

$0

$0

Infrastructure
Expenditures

Unknown

Unknown

$636,344

Unknown

$503,075

$2,295,000

$332,200

$670,332

$241,983

$1,521,441

$1,055,233

$656,297

$0

$3,344,086

PEG-Related
Expenditures

NA

NA
(Continues )

$8,732,940

NA

$0

$23,368,662

$7,634,284

$9,011,837

$6,350,545

$24,827,352

$8,544,767

$28,543,730

$7,919,995

$7,715,382

Unaccounted
Revenue
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$18,600,000

$2,833,639@

$9,700,000

$8,764,264

San Diego

San Francisco

San Jose

Seattle

Not reported

$1,960,000

Not reported

Not reported

Not reported

No fee

$8,636,884

$1,538,526

Not reported

$2,028,515

$7,070,503

$4,138,000

Total Cable
Allocations

Likely to be only a portion of cable TV-related city revenue.

Reported sum includes some phone-specific fees in addition to cable-related fees.

b

c

$30,700,000#

PEG Fee Revenue

$2,392,212

$0

Unknown

$576,473

$7,070,503

$1,948,000

Administrative
Expenditures

Reported sum aggregates all Franchise Fees paid to the city by phone, cable, electricity, gas, and other providers.

a

$9,500,000

San Antonio

Franchise Fee Revenue

Phoenix

City

$1,571,412

$0

Unknown

$45,735

$0

$2,190,000

Infrastructure
Expenditures

$4,673,260

$1,538,526

Unknown

$1,406,307

$0

Unknown

PEG-Related
Expenditures

$127,380

$10,121,474

NA

$16,571,485

$23,629,497

$5,362,000

Unaccounted
Revenue
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The city collected more than $11 million in fees that year, mostly from
the Franchise Fee which is capped at 5 percent of the gross cost of cable
television. Dividing the amount collected for Franchise and PEG Fees by
the approximate number of cable households suggests that, in 2016, the
average Austin subscriber paid the city about $5.71 per month in Franchise
and PEG Fees.
Tracing the precise revenue driven by PEG Fees is even more difficult.
Budget documentation suggests that 16 of the 20 cities levied a PEG Fee,
but nine of these cities do not specify PEG revenues. For these cities—
Chicago, Dallas, El Paso, New York, Philadelphia, San Antonio, San Diego,
San Francisco, and Seattle—the absence of documented PEG Fee revenue
does not mean that the fee does not exist or that PEG programming is
not being produced. However, the absence of clearly stated PEG revenues
does thwart outside oversight of their utilization. New York, for example,
reports cable fees in the aggregate and, while support is clearly being channeled to PEG facilities and purposes, it is not possible to match revenues
and allocations. On the whole, it is difficult to track PEG revenue through
to support for PEG-related activities and there is some evidence that the
funds are likely underutilized. There are exceptions: Austin’s allocation for
PEG-related activities exceeds its total reported revenue collected specifically from the PEG Fee and Seattle reports spending more than 50 percent
of all cable-related revenue on PEG activities. Per federal law, cities are not
required to spend all revenue in a given year, so it is possible that PEG revenue and allocations flow unevenly across fiscal years (Cable Act §611(b)).
Federal law does not restrict the use of revenue derived from the
Franchise Fee, and it is not possible to precisely account for this money
in most cities. After tracing all specific administrative, infrastructure, and
PEG-related expenditures listed in these city budgets, every city that reports
collecting a Franchise Fee has unallocated revenue remaining. Eight cities
explicitly earmark cable fee revenue for administrative purposes related
to telecommunications; the remaining cities do not specify the source of
funding for offices or staff that deals with communication or cable. Only
five cities report allocations for infrastructure spending and, generally, the
relevant expenditures are for technological investments rather than road
repairs. Seattle stands out for its transparency: after accounting for administration costs related to cable activities, infrastructure spending, and PEG
outlays, just 1.5 percent of its total reported cable-derived revenue remains.
On the whole, the use of most Franchise Fee funds is unexplained.

458

JOURNAL OF INFORMATION POLICY

Without a mandate to report what purpose Franchise Fee revenue serves,
cities appear to largely absorb such funds into general operating budgets.
In summary, cities can be loosely divided into three categories. First,
there are ten cities (Austin, Charlotte, Columbus, Detroit, Fort Worth,
Houston, Los Angeles, Phoenix, San Jose, and Seattle) that clearly report
their cable-related revenues. These cities also report cable-related allocations
in an intelligible fashion—except Charlotte, which does not levy a PEG
Fee and consequently has no legal requirements that proscribe the allocation of its cable-related revenue. Even among these cities, with the exception of Seattle, the majority of cable-related revenue is apparently absorbed
into general operation budgets. At the opposite end of the spectrum, San
Francisco is not clearly reporting cable-related revenues or expenditures:
its accounting is very opaque. The remaining nine cities—Chicago, Dallas,
El Paso, Indianapolis, Jacksonville, New York, Philadelphia, San Antonio,
and San Diego—report enough information to give some insight, but little
clarity, into their cable-related budgeting. Many of these cities lump revenue driven by phone and cable service together. Several appear to report
Franchise and PEG Fee revenue together. Most disclose only minimal
information about related expenditures. Altogether, it appears that most
cable-related revenue in these cities flows to general operating budgets—
but it is difficult to tally precisely how much money this is.

Discussion
Franchise and PEG Fees are vestiges of a fading technological and regulatory environment. Though originally positioned as compensation for the
use of specific public resources and justified as the means to bolster the local
marketplace of ideas, the fees function as sales taxes. Further, their negotiation—often as part of local franchise agreements—creates additional costs
that are likely passed on to consumers. As such, they deserve scrutiny: do
they effectively promote identifiable societal benefits? More specifically,
do they promote local and diverse content within communities across the
country? Do they do so equitably and consistently? Are they otherwise
nurturing communication capacity within communities? Should they be
maintained—or adapted—as separate, freestanding fees? As new technologies and an evolving, piecemeal regulatory regime reshape these fees, these
questions should be considered as part of a larger process to develop a
cohesive communication policy framework for the twenty-first century.
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Despite chronically opaque accounting practices, our analysis of
20 municipal budgets makes it clear that cities are collecting many millions
of dollars annually in Franchise Fee revenue. There is scant evidence that
this revenue is used to defray costs associated with cable system construction with any regularity. Though it appears that some cities channel a percentage of Franchise Fee revenue toward PEG-related purposes, the bulk
of the proceeds are absorbed by general operating budgets. Most cities
superficially account for Franchise Fee revenues, but there is a difference
between allocating funds to “cable costs” and distinguishing between “road
repair” and “public information staff salaries.” This vague accounting is
entirely legal but it obscures the benefits that citizens derive from Franchise
Fees (such that they exist). On one hand, the Franchise Fee could be used
to support municipal (or state) funding to bolster the local marketplace
of ideas. New Jersey, in a possible model, recently drew funding from the
resale of television licenses to create a new fund to support community
news.48 But, without additional regulatory intervention, the Franchise Fee
as currently constituted simply provides fungible revenue to municipalities. Thus, the additional burdens created by the special negotiation of the
Franchise Fee typically are not justified by special benefits derived from it
in lieu of a straightforward sales tax.
Meanwhile, PEG Fees and facilities are withering in the face of sustained
legal pressure applied at both the state and federal level. In smaller locales,
more than 100 PEG facilities have closed in recent years.49 In the communities studied here, there is evidence that a few cities (Seattle, Austin) value
PEG-related activities enough to use Franchise Funds to support them. In
most cities, however, PEG revenue is not clearly reported—which makes it
impossible to evaluate whether legal obligations regarding the fee are being
fulfilled. When revenue is reported, some cities (like Los Angeles) are failing to fully leverage PEG resources for public benefit. In some cases, new
legal restrictions on PEG monies that only allow capital spending hamstring local governments’ efforts to best utilize the funds that are collected.
On the whole, there is a trend toward less ambitious PEG approaches
that reduce funding and continue to transmit government meetings, but
no longer provide for public access programming or facilities. Though a
comprehensive survey of public access content is beyond the scope of this
article, it is clear that the elimination of public access programming is

48. Rojas.
49. Goldfarb, “Updating the Statutory Framework.”
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a blow to both localism and diversity in mass media. New digital technologies and platforms like YouTube give voice to individuals and offer
real distribution advantages, but they do not inherently obviate the need
for community-centered information sources or facilities. Such facilities
can empower individuals and build community ties—even among underserved populations—in ways that are democratically meaningful. Put
simply, reduced access to PEG facilities and content exacerbate problems
arising from the decline of local commercial media.
Yet, the potential good offered by Franchise and PEG Fees is not
enough alone to justify them or their extension to new digital services. As
presently constituted, Franchise and PEG Fees act as sales taxes on certain
television products. Educated, wealthy consumers who disproportionately
rely on broadband to access pay-TV products like Netflix may be less
likely to pay these fees today than other segments of the population—
hardly a fair outcome. The bulk of fee proceeds are spent by cities without meaningful oversight and, according to our analysis, typically without
connection to communication-related activities. If cities require funding
to pay teachers or dredge harbors, the rationale for a special tax on cable
television that requires onerous negotiation is not obvious. Rather, a host
of other approaches to municipal taxation might be pursued. One might
advocate for a sales tax applied to all communication products (similar to
the approach Florida has adopted) as part of statewide franchising which
would eliminate negotiation costs and likely benefit consumers. Perhaps
an even better approach could be devised within the context of a graduated
local (or state) income tax. Either way, the status quo is not ideal and cities’
stewardship of existing cable fee revenue does not warrant facile extension
of the fees to new digital products.
Even at their best, PEG channels were only a complement to local
commercial media. As the business landscape shifts for local media, the
policy mechanisms that governments rely upon to nurture a healthy civic
information environment must evolve. It is possible that some sort of special communication-related fee could be a part of a regulatory approach
to nurturing local, diverse voices. But there may be better tactics—for
example, recent efforts to develop a unique tax-sheltered status for the
Philadelphia Inquirer demonstrate a different way to provide public support for local media.50 Scholars51 outline many other tools that could be

50. Meyer.
51. Ali, Media Localism.
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used to bolster local, diverse media. Open, active conversations about the
information needs of communities and the policies most likely to meet
them continues to be necessary—even if some parties would prefer that
they not take place.52 Coherent policy goals and clear legal support for
preferred mechanisms to achieve them from the federal level down would
help remedy the fragmented, increasingly dysfunctional media regulatory
regime that is developing today. With the continuing retreat of commercial interests from the local information landscape, leadership from the
public sector is more vital today than at perhaps any other recent moment.
Limitations
Several limitations constrain this research. First, the budgets that provide
the foundation for our analysis often offer only partial information regarding cable-related revenues and allocations. The frequent lack of pertinent
detail in these budgets makes it impossible to follow the fee money at a
granular level—and it underscores a persistent obstacle for government
watchdogs. To some degree, this limitation is more of an indictment of
municipal budgeting practices than it is of the research tactics used here.
That said, only 20 cities in a single budget year are analyzed here—the budgetary practices and findings could be different had other cities been examined or a longitudinal analysis attempted. Perhaps more importantly, this
analysis does not delve into the PEG programming produced in different
cities. To truly assess the benefits derived from the cable-related fees, more
information about this programming is necessary. Though there is anecdotal evidence that PEG funds support laudable content, current empirical research does not document the prevalence of such programming (let
alone the size of its audience or its impact). We do not address this gap in
the literature, which leaves it as an opportunity for future researchers.

Conclusion
Franchise and PEG Fees are at once obscure and substantial,
well-intentioned, and punitive. From their initial codification in the 1984
CCPA, their ostensible purpose—to provide just compensation for the
use of public goods by private corporations and bolster the local marketplace of ideas—was undermined by a lack of oversight and, in many cities,

52. Napoli and Friedland.
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execution. Legislators may not have foreseen the sharp rise in the cost
of cable, but today these fees are responsible for an increasingly onerous
burden on cable consumers (many of whom have limited resources). In
addition, recent regulatory and legislative actions further undercut the
likelihood that the fees will be consistently used to provide specific, tangible benefits to the public. PEG Fees—and by extension PEG facilities
and content—are trending toward a gradual demise. Without useful PEG
access, the conceptual tie between the fees and the FCC’s interest in media
localism and diversity is diminished. In the absence of this commitment,
the fees are largely reduced to an inefficient method to fund pothole repairs.
For those concerned with democracy, the plight of Franchise and PEG
Fees is disappointing. These fees are an example of rare public resources
earmarked for local information environments. At their best, they support community media centers which function as hubs of placemaking
and empower diverse citizens to engage in the marketplace of ideas. It is
conceivable that fee-related resources could have been—or could still be—
consistently used to meaningfully support public discourse in communities nationwide. But, given the gradual decline of cable and the increasing
regulatory pressure on PEG Fees, it seems likely now that new mechanisms advancing localism and diversity must be identified and embraced
for modern digital media. Looking ahead, perhaps more energy should
be invested in providing the vision and oversight necessary to cultivate
healthy local information communities. The information needs of communities and their citizens are critical in democratic societies and should
not be subordinated to corporate interests or forsaken for regulatory
expedience.
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APPENDIX:
CABLE FINANCE DETAILS BY CITY

Austin 2013–2014 Actual Budget
Revenues
$9,216,223
Franchise Fees (VOL
2, p. 255)

Allocations
$3,344,086 PEG
related total expenditures (VOL 2,
p. 263)

$1,843,245 PEG
Fees (VOL 2, p. 263)

Totals
$11,059,468
Revenue

Balance
$7,715,382

$3,344,086
Expenditures

All page numbers listed from FY 2015–2016 Austin City Budget. Figures reported are for actual 2013–14
receipts. Franchise Fees in Texas are set to 5% statewide. Reported revenue in the Austin budget also
includes remittances from other local franchise holders who provide access to natural gas etc. The
budget projects approximately 3% growth in receipts for 2015-16 over 2013-14. It specifically projects
PEG revenue of $1,900,000, which is described in the budget to be 1% of gross TV receipts. This figure
is used to estimate actual PEG receipts in 2013-14 and to estimate the television-specific franchise fee.
To do so, the 1% PEG Fee is multiplied by 5—as mandated by state law—to estimate actual Franchise
Fee receipts.

Charlotte 2014–2015 Actual Budget
Revenues
$7,959,632
Franchise Fees
(p. 115)

Allocations
None reported.

Totals
$7,959,632 Revenue

Balance
$7,959,632

All page numbers listed from 2017 Charlotte Strategic Plan. Franchise Fee revenue is listed as a miscellaneous source of general revenue. By state law, North Carolina applies a 7% sales tax to video
programming services (including satellite packages) and distributes the funds to local governments
(ACM, 2011). There is no mandate to provide PEG funding and Charlotte’s budget includes no references to PEG Fees.

Chicago 2016 Budget Forecast
Revenues
$29,200,000
Franchise Fees
(p. 12)

Allocations
$656,297 Cable and
telecommunication
public stations
(p. 115)

Totals
$29,200,000
Revenue

Balance
$28,543,730

$ 656,297
Expenditures
All page numbers listed from 2016 Chicago Budget overview. State law requires no less than 1% of gross
television revenue be provided for PEG functions, but the budget does not break PEG revenue out
separately (ACM, 2011). Chicago does not make public a complete budget that shows actual revenues
and expenditures. Rather, it offers a full budget forecast and an annual assessment of the city’s financial
health which uses actual data but with limited detail.
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Columbus 2016 Proposed Budget
Revenues
$9,600,000
Franchise Fees
(p. 16)

Allocations
$1,055,233 Gov.
television channel
(p. 215)

Totals
$9,600,000 Revenue

Balance
$8,544,767

$1,055,233
Expenditures
All page numbers listed from FY 2015–2016 Columbus City Budget. Columbus does not report actual
budget items by program. Ohio state law dictates that Franchise Fees are set to 5% and PEG Fees are
banned after January 1, 2012 (Goldfarb, 2013).

Dallas 2015–2016 Proposed Budget
Revenues
$27,394,587*
Franchise Fees
(p. 560)

Allocations

Totals

$1,521,441 Public
Information Office
(p. 149)

$ 27,394,587
Revenue

$343,806 Utility
management
(p. 181)

$ 2,567,235
Expenditures

Balance
$24,827,352

$701,988 Street cut
right of way management (p. 220)
All page numbers listed from FY 2015–2016 Dallas City Budget. Dallas does not report actual budget
figures for prior fiscal years. Dallas also aggregates fees from all providers that use the public right
of way, including cable and electricity companies, in its budget. It reports a applying a 5% fee upon
television services, but does not specify a separate PEG Fee (which, according to state law, should be
1% in addition to the 5% Franchise Fee) (ACM, 2011). The Public Information Office provides PEGrelated services.

Detroit 2012–2013 Actual Budget
Revenues

Allocations

Totals

$7,188,253
Franchise Fees
(p. C-74)

$1,198,390 Media
services and communication (p. C-77)

$7,790,918 Revenue

$602,665 PEG Fees
(p. C-74)

$241,983 PEG
expenses (p. C-77)

$1,440,373
Expenditures

Balance
$6,350,545

All page numbers listed from FY 2015–2017 Detroit City Budget. Data reflects actual figures from
2012–2013, the most recent year made available. Michigan state law sets Franchise Fees to 5% of gross
television receipts and PEG fees are capped at 2% (ACM, 2011).
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El Paso 2014 Actual Budget
Revenues

Allocations

Totals

Balance

$6,142,819 AT&T
Fees (p. 88)

$128,830 PEG
admin (p. 261)

$9,682,169 Revenue

$3,539,350 Time
Warner Fees (p. 88)

$541,502 PEG
non-governmental
(p. 261)

$670,332
Expenditures

$9,011,837

All page numbers listed from 2016 El Paso City Budget. Franchise Fee revenue includes some fees
related to AT&T’s landline phone services. PEG Fees not specified by budget.

Fort Worth 2014 Actual Budget
Revenues
$6,766,484
Franchise Fees
(p. F-12)

Allocations
$332,200 Cable
Office Fund
(p. H-318)

$ 1,200,000 PEG
Fees (p. H-317)

Totals

Balance

$7,966,484 Revenue

$7,634,284

$332,200
Expenditures

All page numbers listed from FY2016 Fort Worth City Budget. The PEG revenue is a forecast; only
actual expenditures are reported.

Houston 2014–2015 Estimated Budget
Revenues

Allocations

Totals

$23,400,000
Franchise Fees
(p. 11-7)

$2,411,738 PEG
administration and
maintenance
(p. x-88)

$28,075,400
Revenue

$4,675,400 PEG
Fees (p. x-88)

$2,295,000 PEG
non-profit contract
(p. x-88)

$4,706,738
Expenditures

Balance
$23,367,662

All page numbers listed from FY 2015–2016 Houston City Budget. Figures reflect estimated actual
results from 2014-15.

Indianapolis 2014–2015 Actual Budget
Revenues
$503,075 PEG Fee
Revenue (p. 77)

Allocations

Totals

$340,265 Personal services
(p. 77)

$503,075 Revenue

$1,605 Material and services
(p. 77)

$503,075
Expenditures

Balance
$0
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Allocations

Totals

Balance

$127,174 Other services and
charges (p. 77)
$32,556 Properties and
equipment (p. 77)
$1,475 Internal charges
(p. 77)
All page numbers listed from FY 2015–2016 Indianapolis City Budget. Figures are actual results from
2014-2015. State law sets Franchise Fees at 5% or the “incumbent level” when the relevant legislation
passed in 2006. Indianapolis’s budget makes no mention of Franchise Fees.

Jacksonville 2015–2016 Projected Budget
Revenues
$35,300,000
Projected aggregate
of state tax for all
communication
services (p. 135)

Allocations
Unreported

Totals
N/A

Balance
N/A

Expenditures
unreported
All page numbers listed from FY 2015–2016 Jacksonville City Budget. Actual budget totals not made
available; projected revenue from October 1, 2015 – September 30, 2016 reported here. Florida taxes
communication services at 5.22% in lieu of separate Franchise Fees and remits lump payments to
localities annually. State legislation passed in 2007 legally terminated discrete PEG support as of July
1, 2012 (ACM, 2011; Goldfarb, 2013).

Los Angeles 2013–2014 Actual Budget
Revenues

Allocations

Totals

$12,400,572
Franchise Fee revenue (p. 269)

$9,310,740
Administrative
appropriations
(p. 269)

$18,841,429
Revenues

$5,900,541 PEG Fee
revenue (p. 269)
$540,316 Additional
misc. revenue
(p. 269)

$475,534 LA
Cityview PEG channel (p. 269)
$160,810 PEG capital costs (p. 269)
$161,405 Other
infrastructure costs
(p. 269)

$10,108,489
Expenditures

Balance
$8,732,940

All page numbers listed from FY 2015–2016 Los Angeles City Budget. 2013–2014 figures represent the
most recent actual budget totals.
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New York 2014–2015 Modified Budget
Revenues

Allocations

$167,270,000
N/A
Franchise Fees aggregated from all private
telecom providers
(p. 21R)

Totals
$167,270,000
Revenue
Expenditures
unknown.

Balance
N/A

All page numbers listed from FY 2015–2016 New York City Budget. New York does not report actual
past budget totals, only modified backward-looking estimates. The Department of Information
Technology and Telecommunications oversees franchising relationships as well as PEG activities in
addition to a host of broader responsibilities. In aggregate, the Department has an annual budget of
approximately $500 million and it does not specify allocations for specific programs or purposes. The
budget contains no reference to PEG funding, though current franchise agreements with Verizon
and Time Warner specify millions of dollars of funding for PEG purposes beyond the standard 5%
Franchise Fee.

Philadelphia 2014–2015 Actual Budget
Revenues
$21,559,000
Franchise Fees
(p. 13)

Allocations
N/A

Totals
Expenditures
unknown.

Balance
N/A

All page numbers listed from FY2016 Philadelphia Operating Budget. Figures shown are most recent
reported actual budget data. No information is provided about cable-related expenditures or PEG
Fees. Philadelphia franchise agreements with Comcast and Verizon do include provisions that specify
financial PEG support (Reyes, 2015).

Phoenix 2015–2016 Projected Budget
Revenues
$9,500,000
Franchise Fees
(p. 440)

Allocations

Totals

$1,948,000 Public
information /
Communications
Office (p. 17, 469)

$9,500,000 Revenue

$1,770,000 Street
transportation
(p. 469)
$420,000
Information technology (p. 469)

$ Expenditures

Balance
$3,069,651

All page numbers listed from FY 2015–2016 Phoenix City Budget. Only actual revenues are provided,
so proposed figures are presented here. The Communications Office coordinates government programming and receives the bulk of its funding from Franchise Fees. Granular allocations for PEG activities
are not specified nor is there evidence of a discrete PEG Fee.
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San Antonio 2015–2016 Proposed Budget
Revenues
$30,700,000
Franchise Fees
(p. 113)

Allocations
$7,070,503
Government
Information Office
(p. 409)

Totals
$30,700,000
Revenue

Balance
$23,629,497

All page numbers listed from FY 2015–2016 San Antonio City Budget. Actual revenues not made
available. Franchise revenue includes funds related to telephone services. No PEG-specific revenue or expenditures are included in the budget, though Texas state law allows for a PEG Fee. The
Government and Public Affairs office reports producing more than 900 PEG-programs, but does not
document programmatic costs.

San Diego 2014–2015 Actual Budget
Revenues
$18,600,000
Franchise Fees
(p. 70)

Allocations
$576,473
Communication
Office personnel (pp.
132–134)
$45,735
Communication
Office capital costs
(p. 133)

Totals
$18,600,000
Revenue
$2,028,515
Expenditures

Balance
$16,571,485

$1,406,307 City TV
funding (p. 158)
All page numbers listed from FY 2015–2016 San Diego City Budget. Actual totals from 2014–2015 are
the most recent available. The budget references the existence of PEG-specific funding, but it does not
specify the amount separately.

San Francisco 2013–2014 Actual Budget
Revenues
$2,833,639
Reported as licenses
and fines (p. 257)

Allocations
N/A

Totals
$2,833,639 Revenue

Balance
N/A

Expenditures
unknown.
All page numbers listed from FY 2015–2016 San Francisco Budget. Figures from 2013–2014 are the
most recent actual data. According to California’s Digital Infrastructure and Video Competition Act
of 2006, Franchise Fees should be 5% of gross television revenue and PEG Fees can be as much as 3%
in addition. San Francisco is not clearly reporting the balance of either Fee, nor does it specify how it
funds SFGovTV, which it operates through the General Services Agency – Department of Technology.
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San Jose 2014–2015 Actual Budget
Revenues
$9,700,000
Franchise Fees
(p. VI-6)

Allocations
$1,538,526 PEG
capital costs
(p. IX-29)

$1,960,000 PEG
Revenue (p. VI-6,
VI-50)

Totals
$11,660,000
Revenue

Balance
$10,121,474

$1,538,526
Expenditures

All page numbers listed from FY 2015–2016 San Jose City Budget. The Franchise Fee in San Jose is
5% derived solely from subscriptions exclusive of other cable revenue sources. Franchise revenue is
aggregated with other utility-related income in the general revenue section of the budget. No specific
expenditures are drawn from it.

Seattle 2013–2014 Actual Budget
Revenues
$8,764,264
Franchise Fees
(p. 447)

Allocations

Totals

$3,149,916
Seattle Channel /
Democracy Portal
(p. 447)

$8,764,264 Revenue

$1,333,344
Community
Technology (p. 447)
$1,571,412
Technology
Infrastructure
(p. 447)
$745,236 Cable
Communications
(p. 447)
$1,646,976 Various
administration costs
(p. 447)
$190,000 transfer to
library (p. 447)

$8,636,884
Expenditures

Balance
$127,380

All page numbers listed from FY 2015–2016 Seattle Budget. Figures for 2013-2014 are the most recent
actual data available. Seattle’s budget does not specify separate PEG revenues. Recent franchise agreements (e.g. Comcast agreement effective January 1, 2016) in the city have rolled the Franchise and
PEG Fees together into one charge that is less than the 5% Franchise Fee maximum set by the federal
government.

